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CONTINUITY ON THE COURT: THE REHNQUIST COURT’S FREE 
SPEECH CASES 
ALAN J. HOWARD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his Childress Lecture,1 Professor Thomas Merrill bases his claim that 
there have been two Rehnquist Courts in part on what he sees as a dramatic 
change in the Court’s legal agenda between its first and second eight years.  He 
grounds his findings on what he concedes is a “relatively thin slice of 
constitutional cases”2—sixty-four cases—which he groups into two important 
categories: constitutional federalism3 and social issues.4  Combined these two 
categories make up around 4% of the Court’s decided cases during the past 
sixteen years.5 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful to my colleague, Dennis 
Tuchler, and my brother, Bruce Howard, for their helpful comments.  Special thanks goes to 
Steve Wilke, my faculty fellow, for excellent research and editorial assistance.  Steve also 
deserves credit for preparing the charts. 
 1. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 580. 
 3. Professor Merrill defines “constitutional federalism” cases as those involving “the scope 
of federal power under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth 
Amendment limitations on federal power, and state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits 
reflected in the Eleventh Amendment.”  Id. at 570. 
 4. Professor Merrill defines “social issues” as “the ‘culture war’ issues that sharply divide 
liberal urban elites and the predominantly rural and suburban religious right.”  Id. at 580.  He 
classifies “social issues cases” into five subcategories: “abortion,” “affirmative action,” 
government speech on religious topics” (for example, school prayer and crèches in city hall), 
“gay rights” and “other privacy rights” (for example, parental rights and the right to die).  Id. at 
654-56 app.A.  Admitting this category is subjective at its root, he specifically excludes cases 
involving obscenity, death penalty, the Establishment Clause, and legislative redistricting 
because, in his judgment, they “do not pose the same sharp cleavage along ‘culture war’ lines as 
do the issues [he has] included.”  Id. at 580 n.23. 
 5. Like Professor Merrill’s lecture, the numbers used for this paper are also taken from the 
statistics compiled in the annual Supreme Court volume of the Harvard Law Review.  See, e.g., 
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539 (2001).  For the 2001 
Term, see Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2002, at A1.  Similar to Professor Merrill, my numbers include some per curiam 
opinions, and exclude some cases that were dismissed after argument without a decision.  Over 
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His focus on 4% of the Court’s decisions raises the obvious question: What 
about the other 96%?  Do his claims about changes in legal agenda—as 
reflected in the two categories—extend to other areas of the Court’s work 
product, including other areas of constitutional law?  That is, does Professor 
Merrill’s analysis support a two-Court theory in general, or is it merely an 
interesting way of organizing 4% of the Court’s decisions? 
My brief contribution to the symposium on Professor Merrill’s lecture 
looks at the Rehnquist Court’s free speech cases—a species of cases that 
Professor Merrill does not include among his “social issues.”  The question I 
seek to answer is whether one can find similar patterns of distinctive behavior 
by the Rehnquist Court in the area of free speech in the same two periods.  
From reviewing the Rehnquist Court’s hundred plus free speech decisions6—
over 6% of the Court’s cases—I conclude that there has not been any similar 
kind of legal agenda change, although there may be some faint signs of other 
kinds of changes that have materialized in the last few terms.  My claim 
therefore is that continuity—not change—best describes the Court’s free 
speech jurisprudence throughout the period of the Rehnquist Court.  My plan 
here is to sketch a portrait of one Rehnquist Court, as opposed to the two 
Rehnquist Courts portrait depicted by Professor Merrill.  Before painting my 
picture, however, I will first describe the one drawn by Professor Merrill in 
order to provide the necessary frame of reference. 
II.  PROFESSOR MERRILL’S PORTRAIT OF TWO COURTS 
Professor Merrill bases his argument that there have been two Rehnquist 
Courts on what he sees as differences in both the Court’s characteristics and 
behavior between its first and second eight years.  Among the differences he 
advances: 
1. He states that the Rehnquist Court in its first eight years experienced 
substantial turnover among the Justices but that since the October 1994 Term 
there have been no membership changes on the Court.7 
2. He states that the Rehnquist Court’s agenda in its first eight years 
emphasized certain “hot button” social issues such as affirmative action, 
abortion, and gay rights, but that since the October 1994 Term the Court 
largely has abstained from looking at such cases.8 
 
the past sixteen years, the Supreme Court has decided 1670 cases.  Professor Merrill has 
identified sixty-four cases that fall under either his “federalism” or “social issues” categories.  
Merrill, supra note 1, at 580.  That puts the scope of his analysis at 4% of the Court’s docket. 
 6. See Appendix infra. 
 7. Merrill, supra note 1, at 577 (“[T]he first Rehnquist court was characterized by a fairly 
steady rate of turnover in personnel . . . whereas the second Rehnquist Court has been 
characterized by nearly unprecedented stability in membership . . . .”).  See also id. at 578 fig.1. 
 8. Id. at 580.  From the first period to the second period, the number of social issue cases 
has dropped from seventeen to nine.  Id. at 581; see also id. at 581 fig.3.  Professor Merrill’s data, 
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3. He states that in its first eight years the Rehnquist Court reviewed 
comparatively fewer constitutional federalism issues9 than it has looked at 
during the subsequent eight years.10 
4. He states that the first Rehnquist Court began a process of cutting in 
half its docket, from 150 cases in the October 1986 Term to approximately 85 
cases in the October 1993 Term, but that the second Rehnquist Court on 
average has kept its docket per Term at between 75 and 85 cases.11 
5. He states that as between the two periods, the second Rehnquist Court 
has split 5-4 in more cases,12 but it has decided fewer cases by plurality.13 
6. He states that in its first eight years ever-changing majority coalitions 
formed in most of the Rehnquist Court’s 5-4 decisions,14 but that in the second 
eight years one particular conservative five-Justice coalition has emerged—an 
alliance made up of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
O’Connor and Kennedy (collectively known in recent years as the “Bush 
 
however, do not show that cases he places in any of his subcategories have receded entirely from 
the scene in the second period.  His data indicate that the Court has been more reticent in looking 
at “affirmative action” and “abortion” cases in the second period, but as to his other 
subcategories, his data paint a different picture. For example, a statistical analysis of his data 
show that the Court has reviewed the same percentage of “other privacy rights” cases (.5%) and 
“government speech on religious topics” cases (.3%) in both periods.  See id. at 654 app.A.  As 
for the subcategory of “gay rights” cases, his data actually contradict his claim since both cases he 
identifies as gay right cases were decided by the Court in the second period.  Id. 
 9. See supra note 3. 
 10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 581 (noting that the number of constitutional federalism case 
increased from thirteen in first period to twenty-five in second period); see also id. at 581 fig.3.  
Again Professor Merrill’s data both support and contradict his claim.  He is on firmest ground 
when he asserts that the first Rehnquist Court abstained from deciding cases about the scope of 
congressional power.  His research shows that the first Rehnquist Court decided no cases 
construing the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, but in the past eight years the Court 
has decided four such cases.  Identically, his data indicate that the Court did not decide any 
Section 5 cases in the first period, but decided five such cases in the second period.  See id. at 585 
n.44.  On the other hand, his list of cases indicate that the first Rehnquist Court decided almost as 
many Tenth Amendment cases in period one (two cases) as it did in period two (three cases).  See 
id. at 655 app.A.  Likewise his list of Eleventh Amendment cases shows the Rehnquist Court was 
active in both periods (eleven cases in the first period and sixteen cases in the second period).  Id. 
 11. See id. at 579 fig.2. 
 12. See id. at 638 (“[A] distinguishing attribute[] of the second Rehnquist Court . . . [is] the 
increase in 5-4 decisions . . . .”); see also id. at 576 (“increasing numbers of 5-4 decisions on the 
second Rehnquist Court”).  However, Professor Merrill’s findings show that two of the highest 
percentages of 5-4 decisions by term occurred in the first Rehnquist Court, in the October 1986 
and 1989 terms.  See id. at 588 fig.4. 
 13. See id. at 589 (noting that in period one plurality opinions made up 9% of decided cases, 
but in period two the number has fallen to 6% of decided cases); see also id. at 590 fig.5. 
 14. See id. at 588 (“[T]he 5-4 conservative majorities in [the first period] do not have the 
same monolithic quality as the 5-4 conservative majorities during the second Rehnquist Court”); 
see also id. at 588 fig.4. 
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Five”)15—and has become a predictable and reliable conservative voice 
principally in the constitutional federalism cases, where the coalition has 
fashioned an “aggressively conservative [state’s rights] jurisprudence.”16  
Additionally, he states that there are signs that the same five-Justice coalition 
has begun to branch out into other areas producing similar right-wing results.17 
Having drawn this portrait of two Courts in the first part of his lecture, 
Professor Merrill devotes the second half of his lecture to identifying factors 
that he believes may explain the reason for the existence of the two Courts.  
Among the reasons he gives are the following: 
1. The emergence in the second Rehnquist Court of a “states’ rights” 
jurisprudence in constitutional federalism cases is best explained by the change 
of membership on the Court in the two periods, particularly by the substitution 
of Justice Thomas for Justice White.18  Assessing their approach to deciding 
issues of constitutional federalism, Professor Merrill sees Justices Thomas and 
White to be “conservatives of a different stripe,”19 largely because when it 
came to questions over the respective allocation of power between the federal 
government and the states, Professor Merrill concludes that Justice White, in 
fact, was not a conservative but, rather, was an “old fashioned New Deal 
liberal.”20  In contrast, Professor Merrill describes Justice Thomas as having 
consistently taken conservative positions in all areas,21 including questions of 
 
 15. The coalition made up of these particular five Justices is sometimes referred to (in some 
circles) as the “Bush Five” because of the votes they cast in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, What’s Wrong With Bush v. Gore and Why We Need to Amend the 
Constitution to Ensure It Never Happens Again, 61 MD. L. REV. 652 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe, 
eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 170 (2001).  It was the votes by these five Justices that caused an ending to the recount in 
Florida—the effect of which went far to hand over the 2000 Presidential election to George W. 
Bush.  See Law Professors for the Rule of Law, Law Professors’ Statement on Bush v. Gore, at 
http://www.the-rule-of-law.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2003). 
 16. Merrill, supra note 1, at 574.  Professor Merrill also notes that “[t]he Court has generated 
a number of important innovations in the interpretation of these provisions, nearly always in 
decisions in which the controlling opinion garners exactly five votes.”  Id. at 570. 
 17. See id. at 589 (“conservative majority is in fact becoming stronger and is controlling an 
increasing percentage of the decisions on the Court’s docket”); see also id. at 588 fig.4. 
 18. Id. at 574 (“[T]he emergence of an aggressively conservative jurisprudence in the area of 
constitutional federalism can be explained . . . in part by the substitution of Thomas for 
White . . . .”).  As Professor Merrill points out, the substitution of Thomas for White was 
roundabout.  Id. at n.16. 
 19. Id. at 597. 
 20. Id. at 574.  In defining Justice White as a “New Deal liberal,” Professor Merrill claims 
that White was a proponent of broad national powers and not of expansive notions of states’ 
rights.  Id. 
 21. Merrill, supra note 1, at 595 (“In contrast to White, Clarence Thomas can only be 
described as conservative thorough-and-through.”). 
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constitutional federalism.22  He identifies thirteen constitutional federalism 
decisions—where he sees the majority conservative bloc as having pushed 
through its conservative states’ rights agenda—as cases where he believes the 
outcome would have been the opposite if Justice White, not Justice Thomas, 
had cast the fifth vote.23 
2. The second Rehnquist Court’s substitution of constitutional federalism 
cases for those dealing with social issues24 is the result of what Professor 
Merrill calls “strategic behavior”25 by three Justices—Justices Scalia, 
O’Connor and Kennedy.  Professor Merrill sees Justice Scalia’s complicity 
with the other two Justices in, first, having the second Rehnquist Court avoid 
looking at social issues cases and, second, having the Court shift its attention 
towards deciding constitutional federalism cases as “strategic” because Justice 
Scalia’s backing of these developments appears to be based neither in a sudden 
lack of interest in social issues cases, nor in some newly acquired interest or 
desire to review constitutional federalism cases, nor in any enthusiasm he 
shares with his four conservative brethren for the states’ rights doctrine that the 
five of them have fashioned in these cases.26  Instead, Professor Merrill 
 
 22. Id. at 596 (“[Thomas] has developed a compact theory of federalism based on the idea 
that the Constitution was ratified by the States as opposed to the people, and he has adopted 
narrow interpretations of federal statutes in order to preserve traditional state prerogatives.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 23. In his lecture, Professor Merrill lists the thirteen federalism cases where he sees Justice 
Thomas as having cast the deciding vote.  Id. at 598 n.102.  He then goes on to surmise that there 
cannot be much doubt that “if Justice White had remained on the Court he would have disavowed 
these innovations.”  Id. at 598.  However, as to one of the cases Professor Merrill lists, Raygor v. 
Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002), regardless of whether or not 
Justices White and Thomas would have voted differently in the case, it is inaccurate for Professor 
Merrill to characterize Justice Thomas’s vote (or for that matter the vote of any one of the other 
four conservative Justices) as indispensable to Court’s finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
for the state university since the vote in favor of the state was actually six-three, and not 5-4.  
Justice Ginsburg joined the Bush Five with an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment.  Id. at 548. 
 24. But see supra notes 8 and 10 (close inspection of his data denotes that the shift in 
emphasis that Professor Merrill claims to have occurred is not as dramatic as he suggests). 
 25. Professor Merrill makes a distinction between “reflexive” and “strategic” judicial 
behavior.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 591-92.  The Justices’ votes were reflexive when “their 
votes [were] based solely on their individual reactions to the facts and legal issues presented.”  Id. 
at 591.  In contrast, “strategic” voting involved the Justices considering “how other judges or 
institutions [or the public] are likely to react to the decision.”  Id.  Professor Merrill views 
strategic voting as constituting “insincere” behavior by judges who “censure the impulse to 
embrace the outcome they prefer most and, instead, support outcomes they regard as less 
desirable or second best because of their perceptions of the values embraced by other actors who 
have the power to block the realization of the judge’s first preference.”  Id. at 602. 
 26. Professor Merrill offers the following circumstantial evidence in support of his claim 
that Justice Scalia’s endorsement of the Court’s states’ rights agenda has been largely strategic: 
(1) Justice Scalia’s pro-national government statements before joining the Court; (2) his 
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surmises that Justice Scalia’s strategic decision to participate in these 
developments is based on his conclusion that it is wiser for him to be part of a 
winning team and to have allies on the Court than it is for him to continue in 
the role of a loner writing “principled,”27 yet dissenting, opinions.28  Professor 
 
indecision in supporting states’ rights principles during his early years on the Court; (3) his 
consistent pro-federal government position in preemption cases; (4) his relative silence in 
federalism cases, that is, he has not assisted in the Court’s defense and development of its states’ 
rights jurisprudence by writing separate concurrences expounding on federalism principles, a role 
he typically plays in those areas he cares about; and (5) his authorship of federalism opinions that 
can best be described as perfunctory and that show a lack of passion for the states’ rights agenda.  
Id. at 609-17.  Professor Merrill concedes that there is some circumstantial evidence that cuts in 
the other direction, see id. at 617-19, but on balance he concludes that the evidence in support of 
strategic behavior outweighs that on the other side of the scale.  Id. at 620. 
 27. By “principled,” I mean that which Professor Merrill terms judicial “reflexive” behavior.  
See supra note 25.  Professor Merrill sees Justice Scalia as having the choice between voting 
reflexively and being in the minority or acting strategically and making concessions where he 
could join forces with the other conservatives in obtaining conservative victories against the 
opposing liberals on the Court.  Merrill, supra note 1, at 606. 
 28. Professor Merrill argues that by 1993 Justice Scalia concluded that he was unlikely to 
get a majority of the Court to endorse his conservative substantive agenda in social issue cases 
(for example, overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or getting the Court to be more 
accommodating with respect to school-sponsored prayer in public schools).  Accordingly, he was 
left with two options: either to persist in his substantive agenda knowing that he would more 
often than not find himself on the short end and accept the role of “chronic dissenter,” or, 
strategically, to get the Court to abandon, or at least to put to the side, social issues cases and 
instead to have the Court concentrate in other areas where he could be part of a conservative 
majority coalition.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 606.  For various reasons—those being his 
legacy, influencing majority opinions, potential reciprocity, and pleasing the Chief—Professor 
Merrill believes that Justice Scalia chose the second option.  Id. at 606-07. 
  Once again, a closer look at the Professor Merrill’s data raises substantial questions as to 
the accuracy of his empirical claims.  He clearly is correct in noting that Justice Scalia did suffer 
setbacks in the first period in some of his attempts to get the majority to endorse at least part of 
his conservative social agenda, most notably in the areas of abortion and prayer in public schools.  
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  His effort in 
Casey to get the Court to remove abortion from the list of unenumerated rights failed as did his 
effort in Lee to get the Court to lower the wall of separation between church and state to 
accommodate some types of school-sponsored prayer in public schools.  There is also some basis 
for Professor Merrill’s conjecture that after the addition to the Court of Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer that Justice Scalia would have concluded that his prospects of getting the Court after 1993 
to come around to his position in these two areas became even bleaker and, thus, as a matter of 
damage control, Justice Scalia might have decided that it was best to keep these kinds of cases 
away from the Court.  Based on these disappointments, Professor Merrill concludes that “[b]y 
1993 . . . Justice Scalia’s substantive agenda lay in shambles.”  Merrill, supra note 1, at 605. 
  Professor Merrill’s conclusion, however, seems overstated considering the results the 
first Rehnquist Court reached in the cases that fall within other of his social issues subcategories.  
For example, the Court’s decisions in the “other privacy rights” cases indicate that Justice Scalia 
was largely successful in getting part of his conservative social agenda adopted in the first period.  
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Merrill surmises that Justice Scalia—as a matter of strategy—also came to this 
conclusion because he harbored a concern that were the Court to continue 
focusing on social issues cases there was a substantial risk that the Court would 
reaffirm or, even worse, expand particular doctrines that he abhors in areas he 
cares passionately about, such as abortion and government-sponsored prayer in 
 
In addition to his plan to have the Court eliminate unenumerated rights he opposes (for example, 
abortion), Justice Scalia also sought to get the Court to forego adding new rights to the list of 
unenumerated rights that qualify for substantive due process protection.  See Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that the power which the 
Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) 
infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.”).  In period one, Justice Scalia 
succeeded every time in getting the Court to resist attempts to have it recognize new 
unenumerated rights.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J.).  Justice 
Scalia was with the majority in all five of the cases Professor Merrill includes in his category of 
“other privacy rights” in this period.  In light of these successes, Professor Merrill is hard pressed 
to make the categorical claim that by 1993 Justice Scalia would have seen his substantive agenda 
in social issues cases “in shambles” and, accordingly, would have adopted a strategy of seeking to 
get the Court from that time forward to avoid reviewing social issues cases (including all cases 
concerning privacy rights).  His track record in the first period in getting the Court to refrain from 
establishing new nontextual rights was perfect and there existed no reason for him to believe that 
were he to continue to push this part of his agenda, his record of success might come to an end.  
As previously noted, the Court in the second period did not abstain from reviewing other privacy 
cases.  It reviewed three such cases.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 654 app.A; see also supra note 
8.  Moreover, there has been a replication of the pattern seen in period one.  Again Justice Scalia 
was no more successful in the second period than he was in the first in getting the Court to roll 
back previously established rights that he opposes. See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 
U.S. 102 (1996).  He continued, however, to be successful in getting the Court to refrain from 
adding new unenumerated rights to the list of previously established ones.  See, e.g., Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
  Similarly, Professor Merrill’s findings in the area of affirmative action do not appear to 
support his claim that by 1993 Justice Scalia wanted to get such cases off of the Court’s docket 
because his win/loss record up to this time was poor and the prospects of his record improving in 
the future was equally meager.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 608.  It is true that in period one 
Justice Scalia dissented in three of the Court’s four affirmative action decisions.  In the fourth 
case, however, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment and, no doubt, was pleased not only with the result (striking down the Richmond 
affirmative action plan), but also with the Court’s movement towards adopting his color-blind 
principle by its adoption of strict scrutiny review.  See id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment [is] that ‘our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).  While Professor Merrill is correct in noting that in the 
second period the Court decided only one additional affirmative action decision, it should be 
pointed out that the result the majority reached in the case was one with which Justice Scalia 
agreed and that moved the Court closer toward his color-blindness principle (that is, extending 
strict scrutiny review to federal affirmative action programs and overruling Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), from which Justice Scalia had dissented). 
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public schools.29  In reliance on what he sees as Justice Scalia’s strategic 
behavior both in his efforts to get the Court to substitute constitutional 
federalism cases for social issues cases and in his willingness—albeit while 
holding his nose—to join in the development of a states’ rights jurisprudence, 
Professor Merrill generalizes that Justice Scalia’s transformation from a 
“reflexive judge” to a “strategic judge” has become so complete that Justice 
Scalia has behaved strategically in seeking to influence “the entire course of 
the Rehnquist Court over the last eight years.”30 
No less strategic are the decisions by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to 
join with Justice Scalia in getting the Rehnquist Court to substitute 
constitutional federalism cases for social issues cases.31  He also characterizes 
as “strategic” certain votes the two have taken, which Professor Merrill views 
as “switches.”32  His best guess as to what motivated the two Justices to act 
strategically—both in their support of the legal agenda shift and in their later 
switching sides to join the liberal Justices in social issues cases—was their 
coming to the conclusion that they would rather be popular33 than principled.  
That is, they decided that were the Court to continue reviewing social issues 
cases and were the two of them to continue supporting conservative rulings in 
such cases (as would be their true judgments were they to decide the cases 
reflectively),34 that such behavior on their part would not have been a formula 
 
 29. Again Professor Merrill argues that Justice Scalia saw the Court’s results in cases like 
Casey and Lee as disastrous and was concerned that were the Court to continue to review such 
cases, it would only compound its mistakes.  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 605-06.  But cf. supra 
note 28  (arguing that Justice Scalia had substantial success in getting the Court to adopt parts of 
his conservative social agenda in period one, which success has carried over into period two). 
 30. Merrill, supra note 1, at 604. 
 31. As evidence of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy acting strategically in their support of 
the Court’s shifting of its legal agenda from social issues cases to constitutional federalism cases, 
Professor Merrill points to the consistent refusal by both Justices to vote to grant cert. in social 
issues cases.  Id. at 637. 
 32. The votes that Professor Merrill sees as “switches” are Justice Kennedy’s pro-abortion 
vote in Casey, the votes by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy in Lee (supporting the more “liberal 
separationist” approach to establishment clause issues, as opposed to the more “conservative 
accomodationist” stance with which they previously had aligned), and their votes in support of 
the Clinton administration’s liberal interpretations of civil rights laws.  Id. at 633-36. 
 33. Professor Merrill believes there are several reasons why a Justice would like to be 
popular: approval of the other branches maximizes their policy preferences, a good reputation 
will lead to tangible benefits such as awards, honors, praise from academics, and a legacy that 
will be looked upon kindly.  Merrill, supra note 1, at 628-29. 
 34. Professor Merrill believes that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, if acting reflexively, 
would, among other things, prefer to overrule Roe, allow school-sponsored prayer in public 
schools, and outlaw affirmative action.  He bases this belief on what he sees as the decision of the 
second Rehnquist court to generally deny cert. in social issues cases.  The unavailability of four 
Justices to vote to grant cert. in social issues cases is because: (1) the four liberal Justices are 
unsure as to how Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would vote, whether reflexively with the other 
conservatives or strategically with the four liberals; (2) the three staunch conservatives are one 
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for either of them to make anyone’s list of most admired Americans.35  Thus, 
Professor Merrill concludes that while both Justices O’Connor and Kennedy’s 
reasons for supporting the shift in the Court’s legal agenda are different from 
those that motivated Justice Scalia, they are similarly strategic. 
3. Finally, Professor Merrill argues that the change from a Court in 
constant flux to one whose membership has remained constant explains either 
directly or indirectly the three other differences he sees between the two 
Courts: (1) the shrinkage in the Court’s docket;36 (2) the increase in the 
percentage of 5-4 decisions; and (3) the reduction in the number of plurality 
decisions—all three of which Professor Merrill observes as having occurred in 
the second period.37  More importantly, the change from “membership flux” to 
“membership stasis” also explains the formation in the second period of a 
cohesive coalition made up of the five most conservative Justices whose 
cooperation and collaboration while most evident in the constitutional 
federalism cases is also becoming apparent in other areas as well.38 
 
vote shy of the necessary four votes to do so; (3) Justices O’Connor or Kennedy refuse to provide 
the fourth vote because they do not want to be put in what they see as a no-win situation.  
Therefore, “hot button” social issues that could hurt the reputation of Justices O’Connor or 
Kennedy are put on the back burner, and constitutional federalism issues, largely seen as 
technical and non-controversial, get the lion’s share of the Court’s time.  Id. at 637-38. 
 35. Professor Merrill identifies four events that, in combination, might have convinced 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy to jump off the Scalia conservative agenda in social issues and to 
have the Court eschew from continuing to review such cases before their popularity was 
irrevocably tarnished: (1) Justice Thomas’ shabby treatment during his confirmation hearing; (2) 
President Bush I’s capitulation on signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (3) the situation 
surrounding the Casey decision; and (4) the unprecedented number of women elected to Congress 
in 1992.  Merrill, supra note 1, at 630-33. 
 36. Id. at 639-44.  Professor Merrill believes that a court in flux will be more open to 
changes in institutional norms which in the case of the first Rehnquist Court resulted in its 
adoption of a more rigorous standard of review in granting cert. petitions.  It was this change by 
the Court in its standard for reviewing cert. petitions, so Professor Merrill argues, that best 
explains the reduction in the number of cases the Court now reviews per Term.  He credits Justice 
Scalia for propounding the new norm and believes a big reason for Scalia’s success in getting the 
Court to adopt the different standard was that he acted at a time when the Court was in flux and 
where recently appointed Justices—more open to changes than those who had served on the 
Court for a longer time—would be more amenable to going along with adjustments in 
institutional norms. 
 37. Id. at 646-48.  Professor Merrill postulates that Justices on a Court in flux will lack the 
necessary information to gage other members’ inclinations in any given case.  Without knowing 
how their brethren will vote, the Court will have a harder time reaching a majority, and, thus, the 
result will be more plurality opinions.  In contrast, Justices on a stable Court will have a better 
grasp of their colleagues’ predilections and preferences, which should allow them more easily to 
reach agreements or compromises resulting in fewer plurality opinions. 
 38. Id. at 648-51.  According to Professor Merrill’s game theory analysis, stability spawns 
cooperation and compromise so that there is a greater likelihood on a stable Court as opposed to 
one in flux for five Justices (the number needed to obtain a majority) to turn into a stable alliance 
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III.  THE REHNQUIST COURT’S FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE: A PORTRAIT OF 
ONE COURT 
In contrast to Professor Merrill’s portrait, I now want to draw a different 
portrait of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to free speech issues—a portrait of 
a single Court that has behaved consistently throughout the entirety of the 
Rehnquist Court. 
A. Evidence of Continuity 
My review of the Rehnquist Court’s free speech decisions shows little 
evidence between the two periods of such differences as: 
1. A greater reticence by the Court to decide free speech cases; 
2. A change in the kinds and concentration of free speech cases that the 
Court has decided; 
3. A shift in the Court’s overall hostility or hospitality towards free speech 
claims (although there is some evidence of the Court’s greater 
willingness to invalidate congressional efforts at regulating speech in 
the second period);39 and 
4. An emergence of a particular conservative five-Justice majority that is 
calling the shots in free speech cases (although more recently there is 
some evidence of this happening).40 
1. Decline in Free Speech cases in the Second Rehnquist Court? 
As previously noted, Professor Merrill offers as partial evidence of two 
distinct Rehnquist Courts what he sees as the Rehnquist Court’s shift in 
emphasis from deciding social issues cases to deciding cases presenting issues 
of constitutional federalism.41  A review of the Court’s free speech cases, 
however, uncovers no evidence of any similar shift in emphasis by the Court in 
the area of free speech over the same two periods.  More precisely, there is no 
evidence of the Court shunning free speech cases in the past eight years, 
similar to that which Professor Merrill argues has occurred with respect to 
cases falling into his social issues basket.  Figure 1, which plots the number of 
free speech cases decided by the Rehnquist Court from its first Term up to the 
October 2001 Term,42 helps illustrate this point.  While the actual numbers of 
free speech cases dropped in the second period with the rest of the Court’s 
 
that will become stronger and branch out over time.  Professor Merrill argues that this has 
occurred on the second Rehnquist Court with the establishment of the Bush Five, see supra note 
15, which Professor Merrill sees as one manifestation of the stability of the second Rehnquist 
Court. 
 39. See infra note 58. 
 40. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
 41. See supra notes 7, 8, and 10. 
 42. For the cases used to generate Figure 1 and the associated statistics, see Appendix infra. 
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docket, the percentage of free speech cases decided in each period has 
remained constant.  In every year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court has 
decided on average slightly more than six free speech cases per Term, and 
never less than two in any Term.  During its first eight years, the Rehnquist 
Court decided a total of 1011 cases, 65 of which were free speech cases.  This 
is a percentage of 6.4%.  In its second eight years, the Court decided a total of 
659 cases, 43 of which were free speech cases.  That is a percentage of 6.5%.  
In fact, during the past two Terms, the percentage of free speech cases has 
increased to over 9% of the Court’s argued cases.43  If this trend continues, free 
speech cases will become proportionally a larger part of the Court’s docket 
than in the past. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
Number of Free Speech Cases Decided by the Rehnquist Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Change in Free Speech Agenda in the Second Rehnquist Court? 
The data also show that there have not been any significant shift in the 
kinds of free speech cases the Rehnquist Court decided in the two periods.  
 
 43. The 2000 Term heard eighty-six cases, eight of which were Free Speech cases (9%).  See 
Appendix infra.  The 2001 Term heard seventy-five cases, seven of which were Free Speech 
cases (9%).  See Appendix infra. 
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While, in both periods, the Court decided an eclectic group of free speech 
cases, there is a substantial overlap in the kinds of cases the Court reviewed.  
In both periods, the Court adjudged “commercial speech” cases, 44 “campaign 
finance” cases,45 “religious speech” cases,46 “sexually explicit speech” cases,47 
“cable regulation” cases,48 “campaign speech” cases,49 “abortion clinic protest” 
cases,50 and so forth.  The Court even reviewed nude dancing cases in both 
periods.51  In fact, there are few, if any, free speech cases from one period that 
cannot be paired with a case decided in the second period. 
The data also show an overlap in the concentrations of types of cases.  In 
both periods, the Court’s preoccupation has been the same: money and sex.  In 
each period, the two largest categories of cases have been commercial speech 
cases and sexually explicit speech cases.  Between 1987 and 1994, the Court 
decided eight commercial speech cases52 (about 12% of the total free speech 
cases decided during that period).  Between 1995 and 2002, the Court 
reviewed nine commercial speech cases53 (approximately 21% of its free 
speech docket).  Sexually explicit speech cases—a category including 
 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (from the first period); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (from the second period). 
 45. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (from the first 
period); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (from the second 
period). 
 46. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
(from the first period); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (from the 
second period). 
 47. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (from the 
first period); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (from the second period). 
 48. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (from the first period); 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (from the second period). 
 49. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (from the 
first period); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (from the second period). 
 50. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (from the first 
period); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (from the second period). 
 51. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (from the first period); City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (from the second period). 
 52. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 
(1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 
(1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel v. Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); S.F. Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 53. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001); L.A. 
Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Greater New Orleans Broad. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 
U.S. 457 (1997); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Fla. Bar v. Went for 
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
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obscenity, near obscene speech, child pornography, and sexually explicit 
speech deemed harmful to children—was also well represented in both periods.  
Between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court decided eight cases dealing with 
sexually explicit speech54 (about 12% of the total free speech cases decided 
during that period).  Between 1995 and 2002, the Court decided seven such 
cases55 (approximately 16% of its free speech docket). 
3. Less Hospitable to Free Speech Claims in the Second Rehnquist 
Court? 
Another indicator of continuity throughout the duration of the Rehnquist 
Court is the pro-free speech results seen in both periods.  Figure 2 displays 
these results graphically by comparing the records of success of the free speech 
claimants and the government in both periods.56  Putting to the side the handful 
of cases where both the free speech claimant and the government won,57 in the 
first eight years, the free speech proponent prevailed thirty-four times with the 
government victorious twenty-five times, a winning percentage for the free 
speech advocate of 58%.  In the second period, the free speech supporter 
succeeded in twenty-six cases with the government triumphant in fifteen cases, 
a win/loss percentage for the free speech partisan of over 60%.  Whatever 
differences exist in the Court’s makeup between the two periods, as well as the 
changes from fluctuation to that of stability, the fact remains that in both 
periods the party championing free speech rights found the Court more 
hospitable than hostile.58 
 
 54. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); Barnes, 501 U.S. 560; Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Sable 
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 
576 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); City of Newport v. 
Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986). 
 55. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; NEA v. Finley, 524 
U.S. 569 (1998); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
 56. For the cases used to generate Figure 2, see Appendix infra. 
 57. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Denver Area 
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. 727; Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753 (1994); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. 
215; Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 489 U.S. 46; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., 492 U.S. 115; 
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 58. The federal government has an especially bad record against the free speech claimant in 
the second period, having lost in eleven of fifteen cases.  In comparison, the federal government 
won nine, lost two, and tied two in the first period. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Success Record in Free Speech Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Signs of an Increase in 5-4 Free Speech Decisions in the Second 
Rehnquist Court and the Emergence of a Conservative Bloc? 
Professor Merrill points to an increase in the percentage of 5-4 decisions in 
the past eight years as further evidence of the existence of two different 
Courts.59  Moreover, he sees one particular five-Justice conservative coalition 
as having emerged in the second period and as having been calling the tune—a 
conservative sounding one—that has been heard most clearly in the Court’s 
constitutional federalism cases, but whose melody has also been detectable in 
other areas as well.60 
Turning to the free speech cases, one does not see a similar increase in the 
absolute numbers of 5-4 decisions from the first to the second periods.  
Between 1986 and 1994, the Court voted 5-4 in seventeen of its free speech 
cases.61  Between 1995 and 2002, the Court split 5-4 in thirteen cases.62  On 
 
 59. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 587-89. 
 60. See id. at 650-51. 
 61. See Madsen, 512 U.S. 753; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Int’l 
Soc’y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (II), 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Forsyth County v. The 
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); 
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the other hand, the percentage of 5-4 decisions has increased slightly, going 
from 26% in the former period to 30% in the latter period.  Perhaps of greater 
saliency to Professor Merrill’s thesis is that the Bush Five accounts for five of 
the thirteen 5-4 decisions in the second period, which constitutes 38% of the 
total.63  Moreover, four of the five Bush Five decisions have occurred in the 
past three Terms, and two of the four occurred this past Term.64 
Whereas Professor Merrill’s findings support his claim that the Court had 
divided into federalist and anti-federalist camps in its constitutional federalism 
cases,65 the evidence of any similar dichotomy having formed in the free 
speech area is less evident.66  Moreover, there is no support for any claim that 
the Bush Five in those free speech cases whose outcome the coalition has 
controlled can be seen as having struck conservative notes.  In four of the 5-4 
decisions where the coalition dictated the results, the prevailing party was the 
free speech advocate.67  If there is now emerging in the area of free speech the 
same five-Justice bloc that is calling the tunes for the Court in its constitutional 
federalism cases, then it should be noted that the tune they are playing has been 
largely pleasant to the ears of free speech claimants. 
 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 
(1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); United  States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 
(1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); 
FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. 215; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 
489 U.S. 46; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 62. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); City of L.A. v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 535 U.S. 357 (2002); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Boy Scouts 
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 
(2000); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 520 U.S. 180; Schenck, 519 U.S. 537; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819 (1995); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 63. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765; Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525; Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
 64. See cases cited supra note 63. 
 65. See supra note 23 (listing cases where the court divided into the same two camps); see 
generally Kathleen Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Terms Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995). 
 66. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
 67. The free speech claimant prevailed in Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525; Dale, 530 U.S. 640; and Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. 
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5. Changes in Winning/Losing Percentages in Free Speech Cases of 
Those Five Justices Whose Careers Have Spanned the Entire Period 
of the Rehnquist Court 
Professor Merrill notes that four of the current Justices—Justices Scalia, 
O’Connor, Stevens and Kennedy68—have served alongside William Rehnquist 
throughout the entirety of his tenure as Chief Justice.  Again, Professor Merrill 
views as one consequence of the decision of three of the four—Justices Scalia, 
O’Connor and Kennedy—to have engaged in strategic behavior during the past 
eight years69 to be the impressive win/loss record the three have achieved 
along with that of Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice in the second period in 
the Court’s constitutional federalism cases.70  Generalizing from the successes 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other members of the Bush Five have had in 
the area of constitutional federalism, Professor Merrill characterizes the second 
Rehnquist Court as not only distinct from the Court that sat from 1986 until 
1994, but also as one that is ‘“disciplined”’ and “well-oiled”—a Court that 
smoothly and almost effortlessly has and continues to spew out legal rules that 
the Chief Justice and the other conservative Justices have found largely to their 
liking.71 
If Professor Merrill’s assessment of the Second Rehnquist Court as an 
efficient machine that consistently has been cranking out a steady stream of 
conservative decisions is correct, it should follow that a comparison of the 
win/loss records of the nine Justices in free speech decisions in the second 
period would show the conservative Justices to have better records than that of 
their more liberal colleagues.  One should also expect to see Justice Scalia’s 
win/loss record in free speech cases to have improved in the second period in 
light of his transformation from a “reflexive” judge to a “strategic” one, a 
change after all that Justice Scalia has made—or so Professor Merrill claims—
at least in part for the purpose of improving his win/loss record generally.  
Moreover, for the same reason, his ratio of wins to losses in free speech cases 
 
 68. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 593 n.75.  Kennedy replaced Powell one year into the 
Rehnquist Court.  “[F]or practicable purposes Justice Kennedy has been a fixture of the Court 
throughout its duration.”  Id. 
 69. See id. at 601 (discussing Justice Scalia); id. at 628-38 (discussing Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor). 
 70. See id. at 597 n.98.  Although the Bush Five has racked up an impressive number of 
victories in the second period in those cases that Professor Merrill includes within the category of 
constitutional federalism cases, the coalition’s batting average is not 1.000.  For example, four of 
the Bush Five were in dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 799 (1995).  In that 
case, Justice Kennedy switched over to join the four more liberal Justices in rejecting the states’ 
right position offered by Arkansas.  Likewise, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 
U.S. 30 (1994), Justice Kennedy again abandoned the other four conservative Justices in joining 
with the liberals in rejecting the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim. 
 71. Merrill, supra note 1, at 590. 
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in the second period should be better than that of his four more liberal 
colleagues.  Similarly, Professor Merrill’s claim that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
finds the overall work product of the second Rehnquist Court to be largely 
compatible with his jurisprudential views72 should also be reflected in an 
improvement in the Chief Justice’s win/loss record in free speech cases in the 
second period.  In contrast, Justice Stevens, the one liberal Justice whose 
tenure has extended over both periods of the Rehnquist Court, should have 
seen his record decline, as the bonds of reciprocity among the conservative 
Justices that Professor Merrill sees as having strengthened and deepened begin 
to impact on all areas of the Court’s docket including its free speech cases. 
The data, however, do not support such findings.  Figure 3A, which 
compares the winning percentages of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Stevens in free speech cases in both periods, 
and Figure 3B, which shows the winning percentages in free speech cases of 
all of the Justices currently serving on the second Rehnquist Court, tell a 
different story than the one suggested above.73  During the first eight years of 
the Rehnquist Court, Justice Scalia was with the majority in free speech cases 
an impressive 78% of the time.  In the last eight years, his winning percentage 
in free speech cases fell to 65%.  In his first eight years as Chief Justice, 
William Rehnquist voted with the majority 71% of the time in free speech 
cases.  Since then his winning percentage has fallen to 67%.  While Justice 
Scalia and the Chief Justice have won more free speech cases than they have 
lost (as is true for all of the Justices), the fact remains that their win/loss 
records have fallen, not risen, during the second Rehnquist Court.  On the other 
hand, Justice Stevens’ record in free speech cases has actually improved 
between the two periods. 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. For the cases used to generate Figures 3A and 3B, see Appendix infra. 
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FIGURE 3A 
 
Winning Percentage of Justices (Both Periods) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3B 
 
Win Percentage in Free Speech Cases 
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6. Drop in the Number of Plurality Opinions in Free Speech Cases in the 
Second Rehnquist Court? 
The final difference that Professor Merrill identifies for distinguishing 
between the first and second Rehnquist Courts is a decline in the number of 
plurality opinions in the second period.74  Along with social issues cases, 
Professor Merrill argues that plurality opinions have largely receded from the 
scene during the second Rehnquist Court.  Here, the evidence in the free 
speech area corresponds somewhat, but not entirely, with what Professor 
Merrill’s claims to be the almost total demise of plurality opinions during the 
second period of the Rehnquist Court.  Figure 4 plots the number of plurality 
opinions in free speech cases per Term from the beginning of the Rehnquist 
Court through the October 2001 Term.75  As the chart shows, in the first 
period, there were sixteen free speech cases where a majority was unable to 
join one opinion.  The number of plurality opinions has dropped to eight in the 
second period.  Percentage-wise, however, the decline has been less dramatic, 
going from 25% to 19%.  In looking at the number and percentage of plurality 
decisions in free speech cases in the second period, however, one can not 
assert, as Professor Merrill does, that such opinions are close to becoming 
extinct in the second Rehnquist Court.  In the area of free speech, it seems 
inaccurate even to characterize plurality opinions as having become an 
endangered species in the second Rehnquist Court. 
 
 74. See supra note 37. 
 75. For the cases used to generate Figure 4, see Appendix infra. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Number of Plurality Opinions in Free Speech Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III.  SO WHAT DOES MY PORTRAIT SAY ABOUT PROFESSOR MERRILL’S 
PORTRAIT? 
The question remains: What do my findings tell us about Professor 
Merrill’s thesis.  In particular what do they tell us about the importance and/or 
universality of the causal factors that he points to as explaining the differences 
he sees, especially the differences in the shift from social issues cases to 
constitutional federalism issues cases?  I see three possible answers: 
First, perhaps there is something special about free speech cases so that 
Professor Merrill is right not to include them in his basket of social issues 
cases.  Therefore, one should not expect any—much less all—of the political 
science models he uses to provide explanations for the Court’s behavior.  Free 
speech cases can be seen as an outlier of the Court’s legal jurisprudence.  Why, 
however, should that be the case?  Surely issues such as child pornography, 
restrictions on cigarette advertising directed at children, and sexually explicit 
speech on the Internet, to name three free speech issues with which the second 
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Rehnquist Court has grappled,76 are no less “social” and no less “hot button” 
issues than those Professor Merrill has defined as falling within his basket of 
social issues.77 
 
 76. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (child pornography); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (cigarette advertising directed at children); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (sexually explicit speech on the Internet). 
 77. As noted earlier, see supra note 4, Professor Merrill offers a rebuttal to criticisms about 
how he created his “social issues” category.  Essentially, he argues that he only wanted to include 
cases where liberals and conservatives are starkly divided—like abortion and affirmative action.  
See Merrill, supra note 1, at 580 n.23.  In doing so, he is able to exclude free speech (for example, 
obscenity cases) because such cases do not polarize the right and the left.  Rather, most 
Americans, wherever they fall on the political spectrum, for the most part see eye-to-eye on most 
free speech issues (for example, they favor government regulation of obscenity, child 
pornography and false and misleading advertising, and they oppose government regulation of 
political speech). 
  My response to this rebuttal is that even accepting the reluctance of his criterion 
(“cultural war”), it is not clear it serves to distinguish several, if not most, of the cases he includes 
in his social issues basket from the vast majority of free speech cases that he excludes.  For 
example, while it is true that most Americans support government regulation of child 
pornography and oppose government regulation of political speech, it is also the case that most 
Americans oppose physician-assisted suicide and support parental rights.  Accordingly, it is 
difficult to distinguish Professor Merrill’s “other privacy cases” from free speech cases. 
  There is, however, a second response that is more fundamental: how appropriate is his 
“culture war” criterion in the first place?  Professor Merrill uses it to identify cases that he 
believes Justices O’Connor and Kennedy for strategic reasons wanted to avoid deciding because 
if they decided these issues reflexively (that is, supported conservative results) they would have 
risked losing popularity with the political (liberal) elite.  This is something Professor Merrill 
surmises that they want to avoid, especially if the shabby way the liberal elite treated Justice 
Thomas during his confirmation hearings is any indication of their wrath.  See Merrill, supra note 
1, at 630-31 (noting that the inclusion into Thomas’s confirmation hearing of Anita Hill’s 
allegations of sexual impropriety by the nominee served as “a warning to the sitting Justices that 
if they persisted down the path of seeking to overturn Roe and securing other conservative 
objectives, they could expect equivalent retaliation of an unspecified nature”) 
  The “culture war” criterion, even if valid, cannot explain the behavior of either Justice 
O’Connor or Justice Kennedy in their approach to free speech cases.  If Professor Merrill is 
correct that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy wanted to avoid cases (that is, cases Professor 
Merrill places in his social issues basket) that if they voted “conservative” they would get in 
trouble with powerful (liberal) forces with whom they do not want to quarrel, it should also 
follow that the two of them would want to avoid deciding cases that would get everyone angry at 
them—liberals and conservatives alike.  Moreover, if Professor Merrill is right that both liberals 
and conservatives are pretty much on the same page when it comes to regulation of speech and if 
conservatives and liberals alike have no problem with government regulation of obscenity and 
sexually-explicit speech generally, then Justices O’Connor and Kennedy—consistent with 
Professor Merrill’s thesis—would avoid casting votes that would upset everyone.  Yet, both 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy voted to strike down the Communications Decency Act, see 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which was popular legislation, and they 
both voted to strike down government attempts to shield children from tobacco advertising, which 
is also popular legislation.  Moreover, Justice Kennedy (although not Justice O’Connor) twice 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
856 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:835 
A second possibility is that maybe there is something special and unique 
about the sixty-four cases to which Professor Merrill has confined his analysis, 
so that the models apply to them, but not to other areas of the Court’s docket.  
If that is the case78—and putting to the side what that tells us about the 
universality of the factors—is it still accurate to talk about two distinct courts 
where the significant shifts in legal agenda on which Professor Merrill focuses 
in distinguishing the two Courts are confined to such a small portion of the 
Court’s caseload? 
Whereas these first two arguments question the size of Professor Merrill’s 
thesis (that is, are we talking about a pattern in 4% of the cases, 100%, or 
something in between?), the third criticism is more fundamental.  Professor 
Merrill’s thesis does not just describe an empirical pattern of “two Courts” 
over a sixteen year period.  It also suggests a causal explanation for the two-
Court pattern.  If, however, this causal analysis is correct, then the same causes 
should have created the same two-Court pattern in the free speech cases, unless 
such cases are materially distinguishable from the other social issues cases 
Professor Merrill includes in his 4% sample.  The simple fact that there is no 
such pattern in these free speech cases forces us to question the validity of the 
causal analysis at the heart of his thesis.  When an expanded study of relevant 
cases finds that exceptions to a theory far outnumber the relatively small 
number of cases that originally suggested the theory, the theory has problems. 
 
voted to strike down laws banning flag burning, which were also popular laws.  See, United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
  My point is that in the free speech area both Justices have shown no reluctance to vote in 
ways that have been unpopular in both periods.  Why should we accept Professor Merrill’s thesis 
that they have conspired to get the Court to avoid (other) cases because they wanted to protect 
their reputations when they have not behaved that way in the free speech area? 
 78. Again, I am not persuaded that Professor Merrill’s social issues cases are distinguishable 
from free speech cases or that his political science models explain those differences that do exist 
between the two periods.  See supra notes 8 and 10. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Rehnquist Court Free Speech Cases 
1986-2002 
 
KEY: 
F: First Amendment Claimant was the victor 
G: Government entity was the victor 
D: Draw—both the First Amendment Claimant and Government entity won on 
at least one issue 
 
1986-87 Term 1994-95 Term 
S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).  (G) 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819 (1995).  (F) 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).  
(F) 
Capitol Square Review  & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 
515 U.S. 753 (1995).  (F) 
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).  
(F) 
Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).  
(G) 
Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 
Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987).  (F) 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  (F) 
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).  (G) Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).  
(F) 
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 
U.S. 221 (1987).  (F) 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 
(1995).  (F) 
 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 
U.S. 238 (1986).  (F) 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 
513 U.S. 454 (1995).  (F) 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 
U.S. 208 (1986).  (F) 
 
City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 
(1986).  (G) 
 
1987-88 Term 1995-96 Term 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).  (F) 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. 
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).  (D) 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).  (G) Bd. of County Comm’rs. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 
(1996).  (F) 
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 
486 U.S. 750 (1988).  (F) 
O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 
U.S. 712 (1996).  (F) 
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 
(1988).  (F) 
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 
518 U.S. 604 (1996).  (F) 
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).  (F) 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 
(1996). (F) 
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Lyng v.  Int’l Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988).  (G) 
 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).  (D)  
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988).  (F) 
 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 
260 (1988).  (F) 
 
1988-89 Term 1996-97 Term 
Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469 (1989).  (G) 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  (F) 
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115 (1989).  (D) 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 
U.S. 457 (1997).  (G) 
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).  (F) 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
351 (1997).  (G) 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 
(1989).  (G) 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 
(1997).  (G) 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).  (F) Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 
U.S. 357 (1997).  (D) 
Fla. Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989).  (F)   
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 
(1989).  (F) 
 
Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).  
(G) 
 
Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214 (1989).  (F) 
 
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 
46 (1989).  (D) 
 
1989-90 Term 1997-98 Term 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 
(1990).  (G) 
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  (G) 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 
(1990).  (G) 
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666 (1998).  (G) 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 
(1990).  (F) 
 
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 
(1990).  (F) 
 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990).  
(F) 
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Peel v. Attorney Registration and 
Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91 
(1990).  (F) 
 
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).  (G)  
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 496 
U.S. 652 (1990).  (G) 
 
Butterworth v. Smith; 494 U.S. 624 (1990).  
(F) 
 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 
493 U.S. 411 (1990).  (G) 
 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 
(1990).  (D) 
 
1990-91 Term 1998-99 Term 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 
(1991).  (G) 
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).  (F)  
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 
(1991).  (G) 
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 
525 U.S. 182 (1999).  (F) 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 
(1991).  (G) 
 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 
U.S. 496 (1991).  (G) 
 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 
(1991).  (D) 
 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  (G)  
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).  
(F) 
 
1991-92 Term 1999-2000 Term 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).  (G) 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
(F) 
Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992).  (F) 
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).  (G) 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S. 377 
(1992).  (F) 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 
U.S. 803 (2000).  (F) 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).  
(G) 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).  
(G) 
Forsyth Countyv. Nationalist Movement, 505 
U.S. 123 (1992).  (F) 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).  (G) 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).  
(G) 
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 
(2000).  (G) 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
860 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:835 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 
(1991).  (F) 
L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g 
Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).  (G) 
1992-93 Term 2000-01 Term 
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 
(1993).  (G) 
 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 
(2001).  (F) 
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 
418 (1993).  (G) 
 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 
533 U.S. 431 (2001).  (G) 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).  
(G) 
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 
(2001).  (F) 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  (F) 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98 (2001).  (F) 
El Vocero de P.R. (Caribbean Int’l. News 
Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993).  
(F) 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).  (F) 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).  (F) Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).  (F) 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).  (F) 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 
(2001).  (F) 
 Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).  (F) 
1993-94 Term 2001-02 Term 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753 (1994).  (D) 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 
(2002).  (F) 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622 (1994).  (F) 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).  (F) 
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l 
Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 
136 (1994).  (F) 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).  (G) 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).  
(F) 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425 (2002).  (G) 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).  
(G) 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 
(2002).  (F) 
 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 
(2002).  (F) 
 Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002).  
(G) 
 
 
